Auctions vs. negotiations in vertically related markets by Bacchiega, Emanuele et al.
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auctions vs. negotiations in 
vertically related markets 
 
Emanuele Bacchiega 
Olivier Bonroy 
Emmanuel Petrakis 
 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°1145 
 
 
 
 
Auctions vs. negotiations in vertically related markets∗
Emanuele BACCHIEGA†1, Olivier BONROY‡2, and Emmanuel PETRAKIS§3
1Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater Studiorum - Universita` di Bologna, Italy.
2Universite´ Grenoble Alpes, INRAE, UMR GAEL, 38000 Grenoble, France.
3Department of Economics, University of Crete, Rethymnon 74100, Greece.
April 3, 2020
Abstract
In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing
vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier
chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential
input. Auctioning off a two-part tariff contract is optimal for the supplier when its bar-
gaining power is low and the final goods are not too differentiated. Otherwise, the supplier
enters into exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations with the downstream firm(s). Finally,
in contrast to previous findings, an auction is never welfare superior to negotiations.
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Non-technical summary
Auctions and negotiations are two common selling mechanisms for production factors.
A lively debate has taken place in the last decades about their relative pros and cons.
In the absence of issues due to asymmetric information among the parties, auctions
usually outperform negotiations, yet this balance may be reversed if informational
exchange is necessary for designing the good, or if the design itself can be costly
improved. Inspired by this debate, in this paper we argue that if the traded input
is necessary for the production of vertically differentiated variants of a good, neither
mechanism is absolutely superior to the other.
In a setup of perfect and complete information, where a necessary input is needed
to produce vertically differentiated variants of a final good, we assume that a mo-
nopolist input supplier chooses whether to sell the input to two downstream firms
either through an auction or –possibly exclusive– negotiation(s). We show that the
optimal mechanism depends upon the interaction between the distribution of bargain-
ing power if negotiations take place and the degree of product differentiation. The
upstream monopolist opts for an auction as long as final goods are not too differen-
tiated; moreover, the lower its bargaining power is, the more likely is that it uses an
auction. The upstream supplier prefers exclusive negotiations but only if its bargaining
power is high. We finally claim, contrary to the acquired wisdom, that non-exclusive
negotiations may be welfare-superior to auctions, because, in our setup, they increase
product variety.
2
1 Introduction
There is widespread evidence that both auctions and negotiations are broadly used in the pro-
curement processes in the private sector. Bajari et al. (2009) report that from 1995-2000, 43%
of private construction contracts in Northern California have been awarded via negotiations,
while the remaining contracts have been awarded via auctions with open competitive tender-
ing or among a restricted group of bidders. Leffler K.B. and Munn (2003), exploring private
company sales of timber tracts in North Carolina, find that roughly 50% of the contracts are
awarded via bilateral negotiations. Bonaccorsi et al. (2003), using data on the procurement
of medical devices by Italian hospitals, report that both auctions and bargaining are used as
procurement mechanisms.
The comparison of auctions and negotiations has been of great interest to economic the-
orists, practitioners and policymakers. Theoretical studies (e.g. Goldberg, 1977; Bulow and
Klemperer, 1996, 2009; Manelli and Vincent, 1995; Herweg and Schmidt, 2017), experimental
studies (e.g. Thomas and Wilson, 2002, 2005; Gerke and Stiller, 2006; Gattiker et al., 2007),
as well field studies (e.g. Bajari et al., 2009; Kaufmann and Carter, 2004; Wu and Kersten,
2017) compare auctions to negotiations in terms of their profitability and efficiency. These
studies identify and discuss conditions under which auctions may outperform negotiations in
terms of their profitability for buyers and sellers as well as their efficiency.
Our paper contributes to this vivid debate by addressing the following questions. Do
quality differences of final goods affect the choice of an upstream supplier to use alternative
selling mechanisms for selling its input? How does its relative bargaining power affect the
supplier’s decision? Does the optimal for the supplier selling mechanism benefit consumers
and the society too?
We consider a two-tier industry with an upstream monopolist selling an essential input
and two downstream firms that use it in a one-to-one proportion to produce their vertically
differentiated final goods. The upstream supplier decides in the first stage of the game whether
to sell the input via exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations over two-part tariff contracts, or
auction off the two-part tariff contract via an English auction. In the second stage, the selected
selling mechanism is implemented. Under negotiations, there is an exogenous distribution of
bargaining power between the bargaining parties. Moreover, non-exclusive negotiations take
place simultaneously and separately and are over contingent two-part tariff contracts. In the
last stage, downstream firms compete by setting their prices.
We show that the upstream monopolist opts for an auction as long as final goods are not
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too differentiated. Moreover, the lower its bargaining power is, the more likely is that it uses
an auction. The upstream supplier prefers exclusive negotiations but only if its bargaining
power is high. Otherwise, it opts for non-exclusive negotiations that, in contrast to the
previous selling mechanisms, lead to above marginal cost input pricing. Nevertheless, non-
exclusive negotiations result in higher consumer surplus and social welfare. In this case, the
low quality downstream firm is not excluded from the market and total output and industry
profits increase. Interestingly, in our context, an auction does not lead to an efficient outcome
and should go under the scrutiny of antitrust authorities.
Our paper is related to the theoretical literature that compares auctions to negotiations.
Bulow and Klemperer (1996, 2009)) show that auctions outperform negotiations.1 Goldberg
(1977) and Manelli and Vincent (1995) point out that negotiations may be preferable to
auctions when quality is non-contractible and information exchange between contractors is
crucial for the design of the good. Herweg and Schmidt (2017) confirm these views under costly
renegotiations on design improvements and identify conditions under which negotiations are
welfare superior.2 We depart from this literature by assuming that the qualities of final
goods are known. We dentify as driving force that negotiations outperform an auction the
higher fixed fees that a powerful supplier can extract from downstream firm(s). Finally, non-
exclusive negotiations are welfare superior than auctions because they allow for the production
and consumption of the low quality good.
Our paper is also related to the vast literature on the performance and welfare effects
of various forms of vertical contracts. The most closely related paper to ours is Bacchiega
et al. (2018) that, in a similar setup, identifies conditions under which an upstream monop-
olist chooses exclusive or contingent or non-contingent non-exclusive contracts and evaluates
welfare effects. In contrast to this paper, we consider also an auction as an alternative mecha-
nism via which the supplier can sell its input and show that auctions are (almost) equally used
as negotiations (see Figure 1). Our latter finding seems to be consistent with the empirical
literature mentioned above.
1Yet, under costly participation, the auction is less desirable from a welfare point of view to sequential
negotiations (Bulow and Klemperer, 2009).
2Pagnozzi and Rosato (2016) compare auctions and bilateral negotiations in the context of takeovers: A
potential entrant either bargains with a target incumbent firm or sets up an auction in which other incumbents
can bid too. They identify the auction’s negative externalities on other incumbents as the reason that entrant
will often choose negotiations.
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2 Model
2.1 Firms
An upstream monopolist U produces at no cost an essential input that sells to two downstream
firms Dh and Dl. The latter transform the input in a “1-1” proportion into variants of a
vertically differentiated good. The upstream monopolist is entitled to choose among two
different selling mechanisms to sell the input: (i) exclusive or non-exclusive simultaneous
negotiations with downstream firm(s); or (ii) an auction for contract exclusivity.
2.2 Demand
A continuum of heterogeneous consumers of unit mass is uniformly distributed with unitary
density over the interval [0, 1]. A consumer θ ∈ [0, 1], is characterized by the indirect utility
function,
U(θ, ui) =
θui − pi when buying one unit of variant i,0 otherwise, (1)
where ui > 0 is the (exogenous) quality level of good i = h, l sold by firm Di and pi is its
price.
Under an exclusive contract there is only one variant of the good available in the market,
whose demand is determined through the standard marginal consumer approach and writes
Dm(pm) = 1 − pmui , where the subscript m indicates “downstream monopoly”, and i = h, l,
depending on which downstream firm the supply contract is signed with. In this case, the
consumer surplus is CSm(pm) =
∫ 1
pm
ui
(θui − pm)dθ.
Under non-exclusive contracts, two goods are available in the market. Using again the
marginal consumer approach, their demands are Dh(ph, pl) = 1 − ph−pluh−ul and Dl(ph, pl) =
ph−pl
uh−ul −
pl
ul
with uh > ul > 0 being the quality levels of the two goods. The consumers surplus
is CS(ph, pl) ≡
∫ ph−pluh−ul
pl
ul
(θul − pl)dθ +
∫ 1
ph−pl
uh−ul
(θuh − ph)dθ.
2.3 Timing
We consider a three-stage game with observable actions. In stage 1, the upstream supplier
decides whether to negotiate – either exclusively with one downstream firm or non-exclusively
with both downstream firms – over two-part tariff contract terms, or to set-up an auction
for the exclusivity two-part tariff contract rights. In the case of negotiations, in stage 2, the
upstream supplier bargains with one or both downstream firms over their contract terms, with
the bargaining power distribution being exogenous: µ ∈ [0, 1] for U and (1 − µ) for Di. In
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the case of auction, downstream firms make their observable bids in an open English auction.
Stage 3 is the price setting stage.
As is standard, we use subgame perfection to solve the entire game. To solve for the
simultaneous and separate negotiations between U and each of Dh and Dl in case of non-
exclusive contracts, we evoke the Nash-in-Nash solution concept.3 Moreover, those contracts
are assumed to be contingent, i.e. in case of disagreement between U and Di, negotiations
start anew between U and Dj .4
3 Selling mechanisms and market outcomes
We start by analyzing the case of negotiation(s) and then move on to the auction.
3.1 Negotiation(s)
Let Ti ≡ (wi, ti) be the two-part tariff contract signed by the upstream supplier and the
downstream firm i = h, l, where wi is the per-unit input price and ti is the fixed fee. From
Bacchiega et al. (2018), we know that if U opts for an exclusive negotiation, it selects Dh as
trading partner and the resulting contract is:
T em = (0,
uh
4 µ). (2)
On the other hand, if U enters into non-exclusive simultaneous negotiations with both
downstream firms, the equilibrium contracts are:
Tnh = (w
n
h , t
n
h) =
(
ul
4
,
4µ(2− µ)uh − (3 + µ)ul)
16(2− µ)
)
, (3)
Tnl = (w
n
l , t
n
l ) =
(
u2l
4uh
,
ul[(−1 + 6µ− 4µ2)uh − (2− µ)ul]
16(2− µ)uh
)
. (4)
In following Lemma we summarize the optimal choices of the upstream supplier in the
case of negotiations, and the corresponding market outcomes.
Lemma 1. The upstream supplier:
(i) Enters non-exclusive negotiations if 0 ≤ µ ≤ 34 . The equilibrium contract terms
are given by (3) and (4). The equilibrium prices are pnh =
2uh−ul
4 , p
n
l =
ul
4 , and
3See, e.g. Collard-Wexler et al., 2019.
4This implicitly assumes that a breakdown in the negotiations between U and Di is permanent and irrevo-
cable (see e.g. Milliou and Petrakis, 2007. Notice also that contracts are assumed to interim observable, that
is, contract terms are known during the pricing stage (see O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992).
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the equilibrium demands are Dnh =
1
2 , D
n
l =
1
4 . The equilibrium profit of the up-
stream supplier is Πn = µ[4uh−ul+4(1−µ)(uh+ul)]16(2−µ) and those of the downstream firms are
pinh =
(1−µ)[4uh(2−µ)−5ul]
16(2−µ) and pi
n
l =
ul(1−µ)(3−4µ)
16(2−µ) . Consumer surplus and social welfare
are: CSn = 4uh+5ul32 and TW
n = 3(4uh+ul)32 .
(ii) Enters an exclusive negotiation with firm Dh if 34 < µ ≤ 1. The equilibrium contract
terms are wem = 0 and t
e
m =
uh
4 µ. The equilibrium price is p
e
m =
uh
2 , the equilibrium
demand is Dem =
1
2 , and the equilibrium profits of the upstream and downstream firm
are, respectively, Πem =
uh
4 µ and pi
e
m =
uh
4 (1− µ). Consumer surplus and social welfare
are: CSem =
uh
8 and TW
e
m =
3uh
8 .
Proof. See Bacchiega et al. (2018) for a formal proof.
3.2 Auction
In the case of auction, U sets up an open English auction over the two-part tariff terms.
As information in our model is complete, both downstream firms are willing to bid up to
the difference between the value of winning the auction and losing it. For both downstream
firms, the value of losing the auction is zero. The winning firm, for any bid it made at the
auction stage, maximizes its profit by setting pˆm(wm) =
ui+wm
2 and reaping a profit equal to
(ui−wm)2
4ui
− tm. Accordingly, the maximum bid each firm can submit is (wm, (ui−wm)
2
4ui
). In
particular, the maximum bid Dl can submit is (wl = 0, tl = ul4 ), which corresponds to the
maximum profit (gross of the bid itself) this firm can obtain if it wins the auction, with the
input price set to the vertical integration level wl = 0. Clearly, Dh can match this bid as its
profit, if it wins the auction, strictly exceeds the value of the bid itself. This is stated in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 2. If the upstream supplier auctions the terms of an exclusive contract, the high-
quality downstream firm wins the auction with the bid (wam = 0, t
a
m =
ul
4 ). The equilibrium
price is pam =
uh
2 , the equilibrium demand is D
a
m =
1
2 , and the equilibrium profits of the
upstream and downstream firms are, respectively, Πam =
ul
4 and pi
a
m =
uh−ul
4 . Consumer
surplus and social welfare are: CSam =
uh
8 and TW
a
m =
3uh
8 .
It is evident that the outcomes resulting from the exclusive negotiation and the auction
only differ in the apportioning of the producer surplus between U and Dh. Furthermore, it
is worth noticing that, for any uh, the value of the auction for U , namely the amount of
overall producer surplus this firm can appropriate, is larger the closer is ul to uh, i.e. the less
differentiated the products are. This observation is summarized in the following Remark.
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Remark 1. The value of the auction for U is larger the less differentiated the products are.
It will prove useful here to define r ≡ uluh ∈ (0, 1), the homogeneity degree of the products.
When r → 0, they are (infinitely) differentiated, whereas when r → 1 products are (almost)
homogeneous.
3.3 Auction vs. negotiations
The following Proposition states our main results.
Proposition 1. Let µ1(r) ≡ (8+7r)−
√
64−16r−79r2
8(1+r) . The upstream supplier:
(i) in the region 0 ≤ µ ≤ 34 selects non-exclusive negotiations if µ > µ1(r) and an auction
otherwise.
(ii) in the region 34 < µ ≤ 1 selects an exclusive negotiation if µ > r and an auction
otherwise.
Proof. (i) It follows form a direct comparison between Πnm and Π
a
m and (ii) it follows
from a direct comparison between Πem and Π
a
m.
Figure 1 depicts Proposition 1, which is explained as follows. For clarity, we shall start
by case (ii). There, U compares its profit from entering an exclusive negotiation with Dh,
µuh4 , and auctioning off the exclusive contract, reaping
ul
4 . The first option is preferred to
the second one if r < µ, i.e. if the bargaining power in the negotiation exceeds the product
homogeneity degree (which determines the value of the auction, see Remark 1). The opposite
it true if r is larger than µ. In case (i) the same reasoning applies: non-exclusive negotiations
are preferred to an auction if the bargaining power is larger than a function of the homogeneity
degree (µ > µ1(r)). It is instructive that µ1(r) < r, for all µ ∈ [0, 34 ]. That is, for any given
r, the minimum bargaining power needed for U to switch from an auction to negotiations is
lower than the degree of product homogeneity itself. The reason is that in the case of non-
exclusive negotiations, the profit U reaps in each negotiation constitutes the outside option
in the other negotiation, which increases the surplus firm U can extract from the downstream
firms Di, i = h, l for any µ ≤ 34 . This should be contrasted with case (ii), where surplus
extraction by U from Dh only depends on the exogenous bargaining power µ.
Notice that non-exclusive negotiations lead to higher consumer surplus and social welfare
than both exclusive negotiations and an auction. In contrast to the bulk of the literature, an
auction results to an inefficient outcome. This is because an auction leads to the exclusion of
the low quality downstream firm from the market and reduces, thus, both consumer surplus
and industry profits.
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Figure 1: Optimal mechanism selection.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the optimal selling mechanism for an upstream monopolist supplying an
essential input to two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods and com-
peting in prices. The upstream supplier decides whether to enter exclusive or non-exclusive
simultaneous negotiations with the downstream firms, or to setup an auction for the exclu-
sivity contract rights. Our results show that the degrees of countervailing buyer power and of
product differentiation determine the optimal choice of the upstream supplier. In particular,
the auction is its optimal choice when buyer power is high and the products are homogeneous
enough. The crucial point in our analysis is that, because of vertical product differentia-
tion, more differentiated products result in larger profit differences between the high- and
low-quality downstream firms. In the case of an auction, the winning bid is the minimum of
these profits, which implies that the value of the auction for the upstream supplier is larger
the more homogeneous the goods are.
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Our results have been obtained under interim observable contracts, thus a legitimate
question concerns the robustness of our findings to alternative information structures. In-
terim unobservability or secrecy of contracts does not qualitatively alter our results. Under
secrecy, there is marginal cost input pricing, which increases the profitability of an exclusive
negotiation relative to non-exclusive ones, leaving the roles of countervailing buyer power and
product differentiation unaffected.5
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